By RedLibertad (with contributions from members of the RAAN online community)

This essay originally appeared in the first issue of Praxis, journal of the Red & Anarchist Action Network (Summer, 2003)

For the most part, the black bloc experiment has failed. The original aims and purposes of the black bloc as pioneered by the German and Northern-European Autonomen were not necessarily to provide a stage which to launch hostility. While the general portrayal of the Autonomen was much the same as the black bloc in North America, the Autonomen also pioneered successes in terms of “the buildup of their own ‘revolutionary dual-power’”. While the anti-authoritarian ‘culture’ has fostered these, the black bloc tactic and dual-power have remained two distinctly different attitudes.

The long debate over organizations as effective organizing bodies vs. organizational fetishism is beside the point for this article’s explorations. Both organizationalism and spontaneity have their strengths and weaknesses, the discussion of which is not our purpose here. A much deadlier task at hand is affinity and spontaneity fetishism. The only thing that autonomous revolutionaries can claim as theirs and theirs alone is spontaneity. The black bloc is quickly becoming part of an elitist segment of the political mill. It is being formally recognized by both the mainstream left and the police as a coherent body of resistance. The mainstream left has disowned the black bloc tactic, which should be no surprise, but anti-authoritarians are embracing this revulsion.

While the culture of anti-authoritarians has always had a consistent amount of ineffectual organizations that exist only to reaffirm their revolutionary status, capable of nothing more than theoretical circle debates and periodicals, it has been the body of direct action--for our purposes the black bloc--that has remained untainted by the sub-culturalization (or “sceneism”) of anarchism. Now with the fetishization of affinities and anti-organizational tactics, the black bloc has been diluted into a Hot Topic commodity, an anti-political self gratification: driving to your local demo with your ski mask and flag.

And thus it appears that the modern “black bloc” will remain the only universally accepted and recognized face of anarchism within the bourgeois-liberal protest tradition. If the Red & Anarchist Action Network (RAAN) rejects permitted demonstrations and marches as fundamentally capitalist and liberal avenues of “dissent” where we will always find ourselves at least one step behind the state, how should we nevertheless act as an organized mass within the bloc?

The problems with the black bloc are as follows:

1) The tactic fails to be anything other than a counter-culture attribute, a stimulus to a coming war, the expansion of global capitalism, or any ceremony of the state (IE: a presidential inauguration).

2) In that it can only be a reactionary force, it has failed to make the connection to organizational and anti-organizational instances of dual-power

3) In its co-option by the general public as a sub-culture, it has become less militant and more flamboyant

4) The failure to have any defensive measure other than the critical mass tactic and the freedom to go beyond it in somewhat smaller tactics (vandalism, sabotage, etc) to create temporary autonomous zones

“Social activism, without the principles inherent to it being internalized, will end up being co-opted by capitalism through institutionalization, crimilaization and/or spectacularization (that is: made into a spectacle to be watched, perhaps even while one is participating, and thus alienated from)” -Commie00

1: A Reactionary Tactic

In the first instance, we can only pluralize the aim of the bloc. Whereas we’ve used it against War, for May Day, against political gatherings, and against economic conferences, the tactic should be diversified to more common instances. While the black bloc has been called for Mumia Abu-Jamal marches, little has been done other than the sub-cultural solidarity for our own prisoners. Black blocs should be formed in solidarity to Jeff “Free” Luers and other anti-authoritarians caught by the system. There is no appropriate setting for the black bloc, so we should not limit ourselves to any kind of presence. This is not exclusive to prisoner support, either. The black bloc should be utilized in all situations with potential to be subverted.

Accomplishing this means that we must begin from the understanding that the only possible outcome for a conventional block bloc directly confronting the state within a “protest” setting, is defeat. RAAN does not seek to actively undertake the massive chore of changing the course of the black bloc’s historical development (either to return it to its roots or otherwise); rather we seek to minimize the destructive effects of our movement’s current fetishization of the black bloc tactic as an effective means of struggle.

However, this also presents us with the problem of diluting the tactic. One of the benefits of the black bloc is the constant revision of tactics and the imagination for new actions. While we have been responsible for vandalism and sabotage on a large scale, the sabotage of ships leaving ports and planes refueling at war stations keeps the black bloc tactic of surprise alive. With the examination of these tactics, we also have the problem of experience and activist careerism. Nothing but caution can be done to prevent this and it is the inevitable reaction to any prolonged struggle. This is also another topic which will not be thoroughly explored in this article.

2: Dual Power – both organizational and anti-organizational

It can be said quite accurately that most disregard anarchists, or those that would side with them (IE: libertarian communists, autonomist Marxists, etc), as destructive nihilists. This is not to get into the old quibble over public image, quite the opposite. Much to the extent that many enter the black bloc only expecting the public image (but due to unfamiliarity and the general inert militancy of the black bloc, fail to initiate contestations to power), people will latch onto the black bloc as the “cool” activism, but ignore the other side of dual-power, both the organizational and anti-organizational (Food Not Bombs would be an example of anti-organizational dual-power). Much of this ties in to the third and fourth points of interest.

While the black bloc has been embraced as a social phenomenon, the counter-institutional work has existed as a separate entity, whose strength isn’t reflected by the growth of the black bloc in any proportion. The end result is several apprehended black bloc participants with no solidarity and a retrospective realization of their visit to the “political Disneyland.” This has rendered many places (to remain anonymous for constructive reasons) into self-loathing (anti)political ghettos. Diversity of tactics has been replaced by prioritization of tactics and many of those prioritizing the fetishization of the black bloc are not necessarily those that are devoted to the aims of the black bloc: militancy. The black bloc has instead become a synonym to anti-authoritarian (anti)politics. This was never the aim of the black bloc. The black bloc is a tactic, not a principle.

3: The Real Fashionarchy: militancy in the black bloc

We are confronted with one question on the resulting waning militancy: are too many latching onto the black bloc instead of utilizing the other principles and setting up counter-institutions, or has the black bloc just not been militant enough? While the black bloc has functioned in North America as a fringe to expose the violent nature of the State and agitate for militancy, the black bloc has matured much to the point where we may have to question whether or not we need to have militant agitation within the black bloc to have it agitate in turn.

The position of RAAN is to represent a broader anti-authoritarian front of militancy. To both represent libertarian communist and anarchist unity, as well as agitate the bloc into a greater sense of militancy, restoring the original tactics of the black bloc. Agitating for “greater militancy” does not mean attacking police, smashing windows, or calling for more similarly useless symbolic acts. Rather, we need to find ways to apply the black bloc while at the same time refusing to maintain it as an easily targeted interest group within the larger liberal (or even leftist) march.

The San Francisco actions of M22 shattered the common “Seattle” tactic formulated under N30. While the mass numbers were still to account for the success, M22 showed us that decentralized resistance—resistance by several small clusters of people—is able to shut down an entire city. With this in mind, RAAN subscribes to these developing tactics and takes it as its active position.

The strength of any movement can be judged by its disruption or lack of regard to authority. Militancy and violence are integral parts of that equation, something that revolution—or any change for that matter—cannot do without. Our violence is merely the direct. Indirect capitalist violence is not excusable and condoning it goes against any revolutionary cause; for us, that cause is to end violence and exploitation, both direct and indirect.

4: The People Armed

In the end, the Italian Autonomia was caught between two different fronts, one against the police, and another against Fascists. The police saw common ground with the Fascists and repression directed against them was always secondary, if considered at all. Critical mass tactics had, up until that point, only served as gung-ho confrontations. Police assassinations and Fascist skirmishes outside of this protective mass left the Autonomia vulnerable. As a result the Red Brigades, Prima Linea, the Red Zorras, and several other guerilla groups were formed, subjecting police chiefs and judges to a broader autonomous resistance. Much like the black bloc tactic, guerilla violence is only one expression of our tendency and should not be made a crutch for an inert revolutionary movement. But to deny it as an option is to give the State one more advantage.

Any participation by RAAN in black blocs will put us at a distinct advantage, in that we are an organized mass with a developed theoretical and practical unity within the largely anonymous, tactically diversified bloc. To use this advantage to its fullest, RAAN collectives must develop a coherent and pre-planned strategy of action as it relates to the rest of the bloc. Obviously this strategy will not have as its goal to put RAAN in a “leadership” position in the bloc, or to incite pointless and counterproductive scuffles with the state forces, but rather to minimize the harmful effects of such events when they do occur, and to overall highlight and feed the remaining positive aspects of the bloc.

When it comes up against police charges and targeted arrests, the standard black bloc responds by linking arms and trying to hold their ground against the pigs. This in itself is a good tactic, and can be especially helpful if it keeps the police from charging over a comrade who has fallen down, or if someone who was not involved with the bloc is nonetheless being targeted and pushed aside by the police. In these situations, the tactic of “bloc’ing up” can be improved upon if RAAN members have prepared themselves for the eventuality of a police charge, and can quickly fall into interlocking defensive lines that will form much faster and be much stronger than the usual haphazard linking of arms thrown together in the midst of a police attack. Such a pre-planned quick response defense can significantly stall a police charge, at least to the point where the rest of the bloc has time to organize themselves and strengthen it. Such a coherent, pre-planned response mechanism within the bloc can also be used to protect non-bloc sections of larger protests, which often get trapped in the police violence when a confrontation erupts. Our ultimate goal is not to push the bloc into fights that it cannot hope to win, but rather to use our own bodies to create a sturdier defense of our comrades. That and that alone should be the ultimate goal of RAAN within the black bloc, as the current application of the tactic itself does not present an opportunity for successful street battles with the forces of the state. The ways and extent to which this coordinated defense can be planned and implemented will rely on each individual collective, especially in regards to the number of RAAN members available, the use of items like helmets, and what formations will be discussed and practiced in the pre-planning stage.

Our involvement within the black bloc does not need to stop there, however. For example, although street medics are often available at marches, having basic supplies or training at our disposal can prove to be invaluable; menstrual pads to soak up blood, apple cider vineger in a ziploc bag to prepare masks for a chemical attack, and liquid antacid for the eyes and throat in the event of such an attack. RAAN militants should also carry with them at all times bottles of water and some type of vegan snack (Granola bars, for instance). These items should then be freely distributed to the entire bloc at a time when the police are not attacking or the march has stalled. This will bring the bloc together physically, as well as create a temporary safe space where people can regroup and share what they have (bottled water is also essential for flushing out eyes in the event of a pepper spray attack). These tactics will help in cementing the practical application of anarchist/communist unity, as the broader movement will see RAAN taking tangible steps towards making the bloc a safer, more successful, more accessible tactic.